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1. Introduction 
From a patient’s perspective, one would hope that 
medicine was always based on the rational use of 
evidence and not simply dispensed arbitrarily at the 
practitioner’s whim. However, with the rapidly in-
creasing volume of medical research being conduct-
ed and clinical laboratory tests being developed, doc-
tors are challenged increasingly on how best to in-
tegrate evidence in making decisions about the day-
to-day care of their patients (Black & Welch 1993; 
Casscells et al. 1987; Elstein et al. 1978; Haynes & 
Haines 1998; McAlister et al. 2000).This relatively 
recent emphasis on doctors’ reasoning skills stands 
in counterpoint to the equally important explora-
tion of how patients themselves make medical deci-
sions (e.g. Redelmeier et al. 1993; Sherbourne et al. 
1999).
Cognitive and social psychologists have long been 
interested in identifying the factors that facilitate and 
impede effective evidence use in making decisions 
(e.g. Bell et al. 1988; Einhorn & Hogarth 1981; 
Kahneman et al. 1982). Many biases, or non-ratio-
nal strategies, in decision making have been stud-
ied in the non-medical world, and their parallels in 
the medical domain are beginning to be addressed 
(Bornstein et al. 1999; Dawson & Arkes 1987; Det-
mer et al. 1978; Dolan 1999; Elstein 1988; Ham-
mond 1996; Hershberger et al. 1994)*.
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The objectives of this study were to describe ways in which doctors make 
suboptimal diagnostic and treatment decisions, and to discuss possible 
means of alleviating those biases, using a review of past studies from the 
psychological and medical decision-making literatures. A number of bias-
es can affect the ways in which doctors gather and use evidence in mak-
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once a defi nitive diagnosis has been made. These biases are not peculiar to 
the medical domain but, rather, are manifestations of suboptimal reasoning 
to which people are susceptible in general. None the less, they can have po-
tentially grave consequences in medical settings, such as erroneous diagno-
sis or patient mismanagement. No surefi re methods exist for eliminating bi-
ases in medical decision making, but there is some evidence that the adop-
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tors’ reasoning is vulnerable to a number of biases that can lead to errors in 
diagnosis and treatment, but there are positive signs that means for alleviat-
ing some of these biases are available. 
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There are many ways to dissect the complicat-
ed process of decision making. As biases can occur 
at every phase of doctors’ interactions with patients 
(Moskowitz et al. 1988), this paper is divided into 
the sequential steps of making a diagnosis (section 
2) and choosing a course of treatment (section 3). 
The diagnosis section is subdivided further into bi-
ases related to: gathering evidence; testing hypoth-
eses by using, or integrating, evidence once it has 
been obtained; and probability assessment (cf. Daw-
son & Arkes 1987).A list of the biases described in 
the paper is shown in Table 1. The paper concludes 
with an evaluation of some of the proposed methods 
of  “debiasing” medical decision makers and recom-
mendations on how to improve doctors’ reasoning 
(section 4). 
2. Making a diagnosis 
Suppose that a 63-year-old male patient presents with 
chest pain, fever and diffuse pulmonary infi ltrates. He 
has had angina for several years and was diagnosed 14 
months previously with pre-leukemia and granulocyto-
penia (taken from Moskowitz et al. 1988). In evaluat-
ing this patient, the doctor must estimate the probabili-
ty of a number of possible hypotheses (i.e. diagnoses), 
decide what additional information to gather in order 
to rule out all but one diagnosis, and test competing 
hypotheses by evaluating the information that has been 
gathered. In actual practice, of course, these processes 
occur more or less concurrently as each step provides 
feedback for the others. None the less, it is useful to 
distinguish between biases that pertain principally to: 
(a) the process of gathering evidence; (b) the interpre-
tation of evidence after it has been introduced; or (c) 
estimating the probability that a patient has a particu-
lar illness. 
Gathering evidence 
The diagnostician must decide what evidence to seek 
in order to exclude some possibilities while increas-
ing the likelihood of the ultimate diagnosis. Relevant 
evidence may come in a variety of forms, such as a 
patient’s responses to questioning about symptoms 
and medical history, physical examination or labora-
tory test results. When one or several initial diagno-
ses are being considered, tests are typically ordered 
to refi ne the differential diagnosis by improving the 
estimated probability of a tentative initial diagnosis, 
which is usually arrived at early on in the process, 
relative to other potential diagnoses. The evidence 
obtained from these tests is then synthesized and a fi -
nal proposal is made (Elstein et al. 1978; Joseph & 
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Patel 1990). The value of a diagnostic test lies in its 
power to change the doctor’s certainty that the pa-
tient has whatever illness is being evaluated (Eddy 
1982). One bias that can affect this phase of decision 
making is “confi rmation bias,” which leads one to 
seek and interpret evidence that predominantly con-
fi rms a pre-existing hypothesis (Elstein 1988). Eddy 
points out several examples of this bias, such as us-
ing mammography not to dissuade a doctor from bi-
opsy but solely to confi rm a hypothesis of malignan-
cy, regardless of the patient’s symptomatology or 
even the result of the mammogram. 
Interpretation of evidence 
Another manifestation of the confi rmation bias is the 
observation that doctors not only tend to seek confi r-
matory information, but they also pay greater atten-
tion to confi rmatory evidence once it has been en-
countered (Joseph & Patel 1990). Conversely, they 
tend to undervalue disconfi rming evidence. Chris-
tensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead (1981) evaluated in-
ternists’ evaluation of symptoms in diagnosing pneu-
monia. Although they were fairly sensitive to the di-
agnostic value of relevant symptoms when those 
symptoms — such as chills — were present, they 
were less sensitive to equally valuable absent fi nd-
ings, such as the absence of chills, which would 
have weakened the same hypothesis. This bias is ex-
acerbated by the fact that present fi ndings, such as 
an acute cough, night sweats or asymmetric respira-
tions, are perceived as abnormal and therefore high-
ly indicative of pneumonia, while absent symptoms, 
such as no chest pain or sinus tenderness, are per-
ceived merely as normal fi ndings (Christensen-Sza-
lanski & Bushyhead 1983). None the less, the absent 
fi ndings may be equally informative in making a cor-
rect diagnosis. 
These results should not be taken to mean that a 
reliance on an initial diagnosis, or hunch, is entire-
ly a bad thing. On the contrary, the earlier one ar-
rives at an appropriate diagnosis, the more effec-
tive subsequent hypothesis testing is likely to be (Jo-
seph & Patel 1990). Without an appropriate prelim-
inary diagnosis, relevant symptoms might not even 
be noticed. Brooks et al. (2000) showed groups of 
medical students and internists a series of head-and-
shoulder photographs along with short case histories. 
Each photograph contained a physical sign that was 
key to a particular diagnosis (e.g. a butterfl y rash 
across the nose for lupus). Brooks et al. asked par-
ticipants to identify any relevant clinical features in 
the photographs. Even though the photos were cho-
sen to be unambiguous (three-quarters were copied 
from textbook illustrations of the conditions), per-
formance was far from perfect. Participants missed 
many of the relevant features and, consequently, 
made many erroneous diagnoses. Importantly, how-
ever, they were signifi cantly better at detecting the 
features when they were provided with a provisional 
diagnosis. Thus, as with cognitive heuristics in gen-
eral (Bell et al. 1988; Kahneman et al. 1982), the 
confi rmation bias can be helpful as well as harmful. 
As suggested by the fi ndings of Christensen-Sza-
lanski & Bushyhead (1981, 1983), present or abnor-
mal fi ndings may seem more “representative” of a 
particular disorder. In assessing the likelihood that 
an exemplar “A” belongs to a given class “B,” deci-
sion makers tend to rely on the degree to which “A” 
resembles “B,” or how “representative” the exemplar 
is of the class (Tversky & Kahneman 1974). For ex-
ample, one’s estimate of the probability that an indi-
vidual selected at random from a cinema audience is 
a doctor would be heavily infl uenced by the extent to 
which the individual’s description adheres to one’s 
stereotype. Study participants who were told that 
the individual was a male wearing surgical scrubs 
and carrying a cell phone, pager and small black bag 
would give a higher probability estimate than those 
told that the person was a female wearing torn dun-
garees and carrying an apple, notebook and shopping 
bag. 
This “representativeness” heuristic frequently 
yields accurate results because representativeness of-
ten correlates with likelihood. Unfortunately, it also 
leads people to overweight highly representative in-
dividuating evidence and to undervalue relevant pri-
or probabilities (Elstein 1988). Positive test results 
are especially salient in this respect and diffi cult to 
ignore, leading doctors in many cases to overesti-
mate the probability of disease. For example, a pos-
itive mammogram is perceived as so indicative of 
breast cancer that it may lead doctors to ignore the 
relevant base rate — such as that women in a cer-
tain age group, without other symptoms, have a very 
low prior probability of breast cancer — and hence 
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to overweight the import of the positive test result 
(Casscells et al. 1987; Eddy 1982). Overestimating 
the probability of a diagnosis can, of course, have 
many negative consequences, not the least of which 
is causing patients undue worry. 
Overly representative evidence also leads decision 
makers to ignore regression toward the mean. Re-
gression to the mean means that whenever an indi-
vidual’s score on some measure is initially extreme, 
it will tend to be closer to the mean when measured 
a second time. This damping of extreme values oc-
curs because most biological measurements vary 
randomly, often being distributed symmetrically 
about a mean value, in the normal population. There-
fore, events with values closer to the mean are more 
common than events with values that are far from 
the mean. The failure to recognize the entity of re-
gression toward the mean can affect many aspects of 
medical decision making (Bland & Altman 1994). 
Often doctors are in the position of treating patients 
with extreme values of a given measurement, be it 
weight, temperature, white blood cell count, blood 
pressure, etc. Measurements taken at a second time 
will usually be closer to the mean measurement for 
the entire population. If treatment was given in the 
interim, patient and doctor may attribute the “im-
proved” reading as a result of treatment. In other 
words, they may take the initial value as more repre-
sentative of the true state of affairs than it in fact is. 
Finally, the representativeness bias may under-
lie the gambler’s fallacy, which arises when a series 
of events seems “one-sided,” for example, 10 heads 
in a row while tossing a coin (Tversky & Kahneman 
1974). Subjectively, it seems that tails is “due” for 
the 11th toss, or that the probability of tails on the 
11th toss is substantially greater than 0.5 (Detmer et 
al. 1978). For instance, the gambler’s fallacy would 
lead a doctor to expect that, having not seen any of 
the usual fi ve cases of myocardial infarction (MI) per 
weekend, the next chest pain would be an MI (Daw-
son & Arkes 1987). 
A classic example of the gambler’s fallacy is the 
evaluation by New York City school doctors in the 
1930s of children for possible tonsillectomy (Bakwin 
1945). The initial examiners recommended tonsillec-
tomy for 174 of 389 children, or 45%. The exclud-
ed children were then examined by a second set of 
doctors. Tonsillectomy was recommended for 99 of 
these 215 children, or 46%. The remaining 116 chil-
dren were then examined by a third, independent ex-
aminer, and 44% of these children were recommend-
ed for tonsillectomy. The doctors obviously expect-
ed that 45% of New York City school children need-
ed tonsillectomy and relied heavily on this assump-
tion when forming medical decisions, even for chil-
dren who had already been excluded. At fi rst blush, 
this reasoning might appear to refl ect an overreliance 
on base rates — unlike the under-use of base rates 
described above — but it results in fact because of 
the expectation that a small sample of events (i.e. the 
children actually examined) should be representa-
tive of the larger population (Tversky & Kahneman 
1974), meaning that roughly 45% of them ought to 
have tonsillitis. Although it is tempting to ascribe 
this fi nding to the unenlightened customs of medical 
practice 70 years ago, it has recently been replicated 
(Ayanian & Berwick 1991). 
Probability assessment 
In essence, the process of making a differential diag-
nosis involves assessing the probabilities of compet-
ing hypotheses until the probability of one hypothe-
sis is markedly higher than the others. If these prob-
abilistic estimates are in error, subsequent manage-
ment of the patient will be misguided. Thus, the en-
tire diagnostic process amounts to doctors’ ability to 
make accurate probability assessments. In making 
these types of prediction doctors do not have crystal 
balls; in fact, their estimates can vary widely. Shap-
iro (1977) presented a group of rheumatologists with 
descriptions of a number of hypothetical patients 
and found that the variability of their opinions about 
the probability of given outcomes for the same set 
of circumstances spanned nearly the entire probabil-
ity spectrum (i.e. 0–1.0). Probability estimates may 
be infl uenced by the availability heuristic, hindsight 
bias and regret. 
The availability heuristic involves estimating the 
probability of an event by how easily one recalls 
(i.e. how “available” are memories of) similar events 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1974). As more frequent 
events are usually more easily recalled than less fre-
quent events, the heuristic often leads to accurate pre-
dictions. In medical cases, for example, patients pre-
senting symptoms that are typical of a disease re-
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ceive more probable diagnoses, as they should, than 
patients presenting atypical symptoms (Custers et 
al. 1996). However, recent or salient events are also 
more easily recalled, regardless of the frequency with 
which they occur, and availability can thereby lead to 
biased probability assessment. 
Poses & Anthony (1991) examined the availabili-
ty bias in doctors’ reasoning by asking doctors who 
had ordered blood cultures to estimate the probabili-
ty that a culture would be positive for bacteremia. In 
addition, they measured the availability of the doc-
tors’ memories of bacteremic patients by asking them 
questions such as how many patients they could re-
call who had had positive blood cultures within the 
past month. The greater the extent to which the doc-
tors recalled caring for bacteremic patients in the 
past (i.e. the more available were their memories of 
bacteremia), the higher were their estimates of the 
probability that a newly presenting patient had bac-
teremia. It is also worth noting that their assessments 
were not very accurate, grossly overestimating the 
actual prevalence of infection. For example, when 
the doctors estimated the probability of bacteremia 
between 41% and 99% the actual rate was only 12%, 
and only two of fi ve patients for whom they were ab-
solutely certain of a positive test result (i.e. 100% es-
timated probability) actually had it (see also Chris-
tensen-Szalanski & Bushyhead 1981). 
Doctors need not actually experience some event 
for it to become more available in memory. This 
variation on the availability heuristic — referred to 
as the “simulation” heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky 
1982) — was found by Heath et al. (1991) to infl u-
ence doctors’ estimates of the probability that they 
would be exposed to HIV at work. They found that 
the extent to which doctors merely imagined being 
exposed to HIV was correlated positively with the 
degree to which they perceived themselves to be at 
risk of exposure. Although this example does not 
deal with the diagnostic process per se, it shows none 
the less that availability can affect doctors’ probabili-
ty assessments via imagined, and not necessarily ex-
perienced, events. 
Hindsight bias is another well-documented phe-
nomenon that inhibits proper probability estimation. 
First documented by Fischhoff (1975), the hindsight 
bias leads people who already know the outcome 
of an event to overestimate the probability that it 
would have occurred. Arkes et al. (1981) studied 
hindsight bias in the medical world by presenting 
doctors with case histories and then asking them to 
rank the likelihood of four different diagnoses and 
to estimate the likelihood that they would be able to 
predict the correct diagnosis. Specifi cally, they were 
told that a 37-year-old male bartender had devel-
oped swelling and heat in his wrist and knee. His 
liver was enlarged and test results revealed a normal 
CBC, ESR of 30 mm, negative latex, joint fl uid with 
20 000 WBC, excess pus cells in urine and mild fe-
ver. The doctors were told to estimate the probabil-
ity, based on this information, that the patient had 
Reiter’s syndrome, post-streptococcal arthritis, gout 
or hepatitis. One group (the “foresight” group) was 
given no additional information, while four “hind-
sight” groups were told that the patient was a case 
history of one of the four diseases. The doctors who 
were given the correct answer prior to making their 
diagnosis signifi cantly overestimated the probabili-
ty of that illness. 
The hindsight bias has since been replicated in the 
arena of the clinicopathological conference (CPC) 
using a broader array of diagnostic problems (Daw-
son et al. 1988). More experienced doctors were af-
fected by knowledge of the correct diagnosis less 
than were medical students and residents, but they 
were susceptible to it none the less. The researchers 
suggest that the hindsight bias may seriously lessen 
the educational value of the CPC format, as one can-
not learn as much from a CPC if one believes that 
the correct diagnosis was obvious. 
Just as mere knowledge of an outcome can infl ate 
one’s estimate of its probable occurrence, the unde-
sirability of an outcome can also lead one to overes-
timate its likelihood of occurrence. In other words, 
the regret or “chagrin” (Feinstein 1985) that doc-
tors might anticipate experiencing from a missed 
diagnosis could lead them to overestimate the prob-
ability of the diagnosis (Dawson & Arkes 1987). In 
one study, urologists overestimated the probabili-
ty of tumor vs. a benign cyst, presumably because 
of the regret (or liability) they would have experi-
enced if they had missed the more serious diagnosis 
(Wallsten 1981). Although a doctor may be justifi ed 
in erring on the safe side when the consequences 
of a potential diagnosis are dire, the infl ation of the 
estimated probability of the more serious diagnosis 
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may rule out other potential (and perhaps correct) 
diagnoses (Dawson & Arkes 1987). 
3. Deciding on a course of treatment 
After a diagnosis, even a tentative one, has been 
made, it remains to initiate treatment. Biases can oc-
cur at this phase that lead doctors to prefer one treat-
ment over another, objectively similar one, to select 
a suboptimal treatment, or to maintain an unsuccess-
ful treatment beyond the point when they should 
choose an alternative course. Treatment choices 
can be affected by the possible outcomes of various 
treatments, the manner in which treatments are de-
scribed, or “framed,” and the number of treatment 
alternatives. 
Treatment outcomes 
Regret can also affect this stage of doctors’ decision 
making. The anticipated regret, should a bad out-
come occur, is greater if the outcome seems to re-
sult more from the doctor’s action in treating a dis-
ease than from inaction (Elstein 1988). This differ-
ential perception of harm caused by omissions, as 
opposed to commissions, is due to clinicians’ great-
er sense of responsibility if an adverse outcome is 
caused by treating something — such as negative 
drug effects — than by not treating it and adopting 
a “watchful waiting” approach (Elstein et al. 1986; 
see, generally, Spranca et al. 1991). To some extent, 
preempting possible regret is one way in which doc-
tors make themselves feel better about their diagnos-
tic and treatment decisions. Accordingly, they also 
tend to take more credit for “good” decisions (i.e. 
those with positive outcomes) than for “bad” deci-
sions and to evaluate them more positively (Gruppen 
et al. 1994). 
Treatment framing 
The framing effect is one of the more thoroughly 
studied aspects of medical decision-making biases, 
in patients as well as doctors (e.g. Mazur & Hickam 
1990; McNeil et al. 1988). According to the fram-
ing effect, decision makers’ preference between op-
tions is infl uenced by the way in which equivalent 
information is formulated, or “framed.” When out-
comes are framed in terms of gains, such as sav-
ing lives or winning money, people are risk averse 
and choose a certain gain rather than a possible 
but uncertain larger gain; in contrast, in the do-
main of losses, with outcomes such as losing lives 
or money, people tend to seek risk by avoiding a 
certain loss, even if an uncertain gamble might re-
sult in an even larger loss. In other words, individ-
uals are more willing to accept risk when they per-
ceive something as a potential loss, and they tend 
to avoid risk when they perceive a potential gain 
(Tversky & Kahneman 1988). 
Research on framing frequently uses medical ex-
amples. For example, McNeil et al. (1982; see also 
McNeil et al. 1988) asked participants to imagine 
that they had lung cancer. They were given probabil-
ity-of-survival and life-expectancy data for two al-
ternative treatments, surgery and radiation. For half 
the participants, the data were presented in a posi-
tive or “survival” frame, while half received the data 
in a negative or “mortality” frame. Survival partici-
pants learned that of 100 people having surgery, 90 
live through the procedure, 68 are alive after 1 year 
and 34 are alive after 5 years; whereas of 100 people 
having radiation, all live through the treatment, 77 
are alive after 1 year and 22 are alive after 5 years. 
Mortality participants received the same objective 
information presented in terms of the number of peo-
ple who die (e.g. for the surgery option, 10 die dur-
ing surgery, 32 die by the end of the fi rst year and 
66 die within 5 years). Participants preferred radia-
tion therapy to surgery 44% of the time in the mor-
tality frame, but only 18% of the time in the surviv-
al frame. In other words, the advantage of radiation 
therapy was greater when stated in terms of reducing 
the risk of imminent death than when expressed in 
terms of increased survival. Interestingly, McNeil et 
al. (1982) found that doctors were just as susceptible 
to the framing effect as non-medical participants (pa-
tients and students). 
However, more recent research has called this fi nd-
ing into question. Marteau (1989) presented a group 
of medical students with a set of three medical situa-
tions, each having a choice of two treatment options, 
such as a patient with terminal liver disease needing 
to decide whether or not to have surgery. In addition 
to varying the framing of information (i.e. chance of 
dying during surgery vs. surviving the operation), 
Marteau also varied whether participants were in-
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structed to adopt the role of the patient or treating 
doctor. She found that framing was more likely to 
occur when participants adopted the role of patient 
than when they were advising a patient in their role 
as doctor. In the latter context, framing occurred in 
only one of the three cases. This fi nding raises the 
possibility that when reasoning on their own behalf, 
doctors demonstrate the same bias as everyone else 
(consistent with the fi ndings of McNeil et al. 1982; 
see also Bornstein et al. 1999); yet when making 
recommendations on others’ behalf in their role as 
health-care professionals, they are less susceptible to 
bias. 
Another possibility is that framing effects are sim-
ply somewhat idiosyncratic and hard to pin down. In 
support of this explanation, Christensen et al. (1995) 
presented medical decision makers with a larger 
number of treatment decisions (n = 12) than previous 
studies and obtained a framing effect in only two of 
the 12 cases, leading them to conclude that the prev-
alence of framing effects in doctors’ treatment deci-
sions may be more limited than thought previous-
ly. One of the two cases where a framing effect oc-
curred concerned whether bacterial endocarditis and 
aortic insuffi ciency should be treated by valve re-
placement or antibiotics, and the other concerned 
whether non-malignant right parietal AVM should be 
treated by surgery or watchful waiting. A greater ap-
preciation of the types of cases in which framing ef-
fects are most likely to occur would allow doctors 
to be more judicious in recommending specifi c treat-
ments in those cases. 
Number of alternatives 
Research on framing effects has typically compared 
treatment choices between two options. However, 
other research has addressed potential bias that re-
sults from having multiple (vs. few) treatment al-
ternatives. Such concerns are very important in this 
era of hundreds. of therapy and medication options. 
Redelmeier & Shafi r (1995) looked at a large sam-
ple of family doctors’ (N = 287) decisions in treating 
osteoarthritis and neurologists’ and neurosurgeons’ 
(N = 352) recommendations for carotid artery sur-
gery when presented with a variable number of op-
tions. For example, one of the scenarios presented 
to family doctors described a 67-year-old man with 
chronic hip pain, diagnosed with osteoarthritis. Half 
the participants were asked to imagine that they had 
tried several non-steroidal anti-infl ammatory drugs 
(NSAIDs), all of which were ineffective; that they 
had referred him to an orthopedist for possible hip 
replacement, but that they then discovered there was 
one NSAID the patient had not yet tried (ibuprofen). 
They were then asked whether they would refer the 
patient to orthopedics and also start ibuprofen, or re-
fer the patient without starting any new medication. 
The other half of the participants were given the 
same basic information but were told that there were 
two untried NSAIDs (ibuprofen and piroxicam). 
Redelmeier & Shafi r (1995) found that adding 
a new option increased the probability of choosing 
a previously available alternative. When only one 
medication was available, 53% chose the default op-
tion (i.e. refer without medication), whereas 72% 
chose the default option when two medications were 
available. They concluded that “the uncertainty in 
deciding between two similar medications led some 
doctors to avoid this decision altogether and recom-
mend not starting any new medication” (p. 304), 
even though the relative merits of starting a new 
medication (vs. not) were identical in the two condi-
tions. The default option becomes especially attrac-
tive when the additional option is clearly inferior to 
it — even though again, objectively, its relative mer-
its (compared to a pre-existing, non-inferior alterna-
tive) are the same whether or not another alternative 
is considered (Schwartz & Chapman 1999). 
4. Improving doctors’ reasoning 
The simplest approach to improving doctors’ deci-
sion making is to educate them about the existence 
of the biases, on the assumption that an awareness 
of the biases will permit them to avoid being infl u-
enced by them (Arnoult & Anderson 1988). This 
strategy is not only logical, but it is also justifi ed 
by research showing that continuing medical edu-
cation in general tends to improve doctor perfor-
mance across a variety of domains and outcomes 
(Davis et al. 1995). How successful, then, are at-
tempts to “de-bias” doctors’ decision making? Al-
though informing people about biases is not very 
effective at reducing biased reasoning in non-med-
ical settings (Fischhoff 1982), there is some indica-
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tion that it can improve doctors’ reasoning in some 
respects. For example, Gruppen et al. (1994) found 
that informing doctors about a specifi c bias — the 
tendency to be infl uenced by a treatment’s outcome 
valence in evaluating treatment decisions — re-
duced its effect. 
One of the more optimistic fi ndings in this arena 
was provided by Bornstein et al. (1999), who stud-
ied the sunk-cost bias, which is the tendency to al-
low previous investments to have an irrational infl u-
ence on future decisions (e.g. a doctor who has in-
vested a lot of time and effort in a particular treat-
ment might be reluctant to change it, even though 
it is not working). They found that although doc-
tors were susceptible to the bias in non-medical set-
tings they did not demonstrate the sunk-cost effect 
in medical situations, suggesting that some aspect of 
their medical training made them immune to the bias 
within their domain of expertise. As the doctors in 
this study were not specifi cally instructed about the 
bias, these results suggest that an overemphasis on 
the ways in which doctors’ reasoning is suboptimal 
may be a case of viewing the glass as half-empty 
rather than half-full: that is, doctors might indeed be 
susceptible to some biases, but their training makes 
them less susceptible than they would otherwise be 
(cf. Marteau 1989). 
The type of strategy most effective at reducing 
bias will depend on the type of judgment that is be-
ing made. The movement toward “evidence-based 
medicine” can be very helpful at reducing bias in 
the stages of gathering evidence and choosing treat-
ments, because it advocates making the best avail-
able research evidence accessible in clinical settings 
(Haynes & Haines 1998; McAlister et al. 2000). Ev-
idence-based medicine is effective at managing dis-
ease because it provides valid and current informa-
tion on disease characteristics, co-ordinates efforts 
of an interdisciplinary team, reduces deviations from 
optimal practice and identifi es gaps in current knowl-
edge (Ellrodt et al. 1997). In short, by providing the 
most relevant and objective empirical information 
available, and incorporating it with clinical expertise, 
test results and patient preferences, many of the bias-
es associated with doctors’ relying too heavily on in-
tuition and selectively attending to some information 
while ignoring other relevant information could be 
avoided (Ellrodt et al. 1997; McAlister et al. 2000). 
In comparison to evidence-based medicine, deci-
sion analysis is a similar, but somewhat more techni-
cal, approach to ameliorating biased reasoning. De-
cision analysis relies on “statistical prediction rules,” 
which “use statistical analyses of cases with known 
outcomes to determine which pieces of diagnostic 
information . . . are relevant to a given diagnostic de-
cision and to what extent” (Swets et al. 2000, 
p. 2). Such analyses, which are typically computer 
aided, can be applied to a variety of domains; medi-
cal decision making has been singled out as an area 
which could especially profi t from decision analysis 
because it occurs within a highly dynamic and com-
plex problem space and has important real-world 
consequences (Kleinmuntz & Kleinmuntz 1981; 
Swets et al. 2000). 
Swets et al. (1991) explored the utility of decision 
analysis in a diagnostic context by asking six radi-
ologists, all of whom had extensive experience in 
mammography, to interpret 146 mammograms that 
were known to include normal images and benign 
and malignant lesions. They read the set of images 
twice, fi rst in their usual manner, and then with two 
decision aids: a checklist that guided the reader in 
assigning a scale value to a number of relevant fea-
tures, and a computer program – based on the same 
scale values provided by the reader — that optimal-
ly estimated the probability of malignancy. Both 
times, the doctors were asked to estimate the proba-
bility of malignancy for each case. Despite receiving 
very little training in how to use the technique (about 
2 hours), the doctors’ diagnostic accuracy improved 
substantially when they used the decision aids. Simi-
lar gains result when applying computer-based deci-
sion aids to the process of diagnosing prostate can-
cer from magnetic resonance images or screening for 
HIV (Swets et al. 2000). 
In conclusion, decision analytic aids and evidence-
based medicine can improve doctors’ decision-mak-
ing performance by encouraging them to attend to the 
most relevant information and to assign that infor-
mation its proper weight — even when the weight-
ings come from the doctors themselves (Swets et al. 
2000). Unfortunately, although decision analysis can 
improve diagnostic accuracy in an experimental set-
ting (Swets et al. 1991; 2000), doctors may be reluc-
tant to use decision aids effectively in their everyday 
patient management (Haynes & Haines 1998; Lee et 
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al. 1995). Instead, they tend to rely for assistance on 
clinical colleagues, manuals, and textbooks (Curley 
et al. 1990). One solution to this problem is to make 
evidence-based services and decision-enhancing 
tools more widely available and easily accessible in 
clinical settings, a trend which currently seems to be 
under way (Haynes & Haines 1998). In light of doc-
tors’ demonstrated susceptibility to a variety of bias-
es in making diagnostic and treatment decisions, it 
is clear that further efforts to reduce possible biases 
and to improve the quality of medical decision mak-
ing would be well worth the effort. 
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